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The Twilight of Critical Theory:
A Reply to Litowitz
Robert C. Ellickson*
A half-century ago C.P. Snow located literary intellectuals and physical
scientists at the opposite poles of the academy, separated by dismaying
differences in method and perspective.1 A similar gulf threatens to
separate the legal scholars who are wedded to the humanities and those
who are inspired by economics and the other harder social sciences.2
Humanists exult in the variety and complexity of social life. Social
scientists, by contrast, aspire to develop overarching theories of human
behavior. Although a social scientific theory must simplify--that, after all,
is the point of theory-it can nevertheless offer a humanist a possible
framework for interpretation and a potential guide to fruitful inquiry. A
rich humanistic narrative about the human condition is unlikely to leave a
lasting impression if it lacks some underlying theoretical structure. A
creative tension between the yin of social-scientific universalizers and the
yang of humanistic particularizers thus promises to benefit all participants
in the legal academy. Douglas Litowitz's lively essay, provoked by my
book Order Without Law, regrettably does little to advance this
conversation.3 In essence it is a yawpn-a primal call to dismiss
positivistic social-science across the board. I urge the readers of this
journal to reject this entreaty. A tolerant and broadly engaged humanist,
* Walter E. Meyer Professor of Property and Urban Law, Yale Law School.
1. C.P. SNOW, THE Two CULTURES: AND A SECOND LOOK 8-9 (2d ed. 1965) (reproducing Snow's
original 1959 lecture on the subject).
2. See Ron Harris, The Encounters of Economic History and Legal History, 21 L. & HIST. REV.
297, 297, 330-34 (2003) (lamenting the lack of interaction between humanistic legal historians and
economic historians); see also ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 6-8 (1991) [hereinafter
cited as ORDER WITHOUT LAW] (bemoaning the gulf between law-and-economics and law-and-society
scholars).
3. Douglas Litowitz, A Critical Take on Shasta County and the "New Chicago School," 15 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 301 (2003).
4. Cf. Walt Whitman, Song of Myself sec. 52, in LEAVES OF GRASs (1855).
1
Ellickson: The Twilight of Critical Theory
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2003
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
even one who lacks any comparative advantage in the social sciences, can
ill afford to ignore this vast body of scholarly work.
I. THE AIM OF ORDER WITHOUTLAW
Litowitz correctly characterizes my book as a positivistic effort. Ronald
Coase, in an article that eventually helped him garner a Nobel Prize, had
offered a vision of how law might affect bargaining between a rancher
running livestock and a neighboring farmer whose vegetation tempted the
rancher's animals.5 To gauge the realism of Coase's vision in a concrete
setting, I engaged in a field study in a rural area northeast of Redding, the
principal city of Shasta County, California. In some portions of my study
area (its "closed range"), the legal system generally held animal owners to
be strictly liable for damage caused by their trespassing beasts; in other
portions ("open range"), the law generally placed this risk of loss on the
neighbor whose foliage was lost.6 I made special efforts to interview
ranchers whose spreads straddled a boundary between closed- and open-
range. I found that most of them knew not only that a "range" boundary
crossed their lands but also of its general legal relevance in trespass cases.
One of my basic findings was that most Shasta County ranchers,
irrespective of the applicable legal rule, regarded themselves bound by an
informal norm that an owner of livestock is responsible for trespass
damage. I also discovered that informal norms were trumping California
statutes that nominally governed how adjoining neighbors should share the
costs of boundary fencing. Contrary to what Litowitz implies, however,
these twin findings hardly induced me to conclude that these Shasta
County ruralites were "living outside the law."7 A motorist who struck a
wayward steer on a rural Shasta County highway typically would not
hesitate to file an insurance claim, or, if necessary a lawsuit, against the
steer's owner (usually a relative stranger). In short, as stakes increased and
the social distance between disputants grew, the legal system became
more influential.
The first half of Order Without Law is a thick description of my
spadework in Shasta County. In the second half, I offer a general theory of
social norms. My fieldwork had made me curious about the content of
norms. Why had the residents of rural Shasta County informally pinned
responsibility for trespass damage on livestock owners who could have
fenced in their livestock, and not on the trespass victims who could have
fenced the animals out? Why did Shasta County norms forbid a neighbor
5. Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
6. At the time of my study, only about 1% of the County's land was in fact being used for the
growing of harvested crops. ORDER WITHOUT LAW, supra note 2, at 16-17 (cited at Litowitz, supra
note 3, at 320). Pastures and forests, often scrubby in appearance, predominated.
7. Litowitz, supra note 3, at 328.
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from taking an animal-trespass or fence-repair dispute into the legal
system, but permit a motorist to pursue a collision claim in court?
Eager to learn others' ideas about the content of norms, I scoured a wide
variety of library sources, including the works of many of the scholars
Litowitz most admires (Durkheim and Weber in particular). Finding that
few of them had pinpointed the issue I was considering, I induced the
general positive hypothesis that, to govern their workaday affairs, the
members of a close-knit group adopt norms that enhance the welfare of the
group's membership in the aggregate. To bolster the credibility of the
hypothesis, I presented evidence of norms that had arisen in social
contexts quite different from those in rural Shasta County. These included
the (varying) norms that high-seas whalers used in the nineteenth century
to decide which hunting ship had the superior claim to a whale carcass,
and that professors apply today to decide whether they are privileged to
photocopy copyrighted material for distribution to their students.
The hypothesis that the norms of a close-knit group are utilitarian for
group members is crisp and simple, but undoubtedly overly so. I therefore
also offered some caveats about its plausibility and implications. In
particular I stressed that, because the norms that help a group's insiders
may be detrimental to outsiders to the group, the hypothesis plainly does
not support a blanket normative conclusion that the rule of law should give
way to a rule of norms.
II. How LITOWITZ FAILS TO CONNECT WITH ORDER WITHOUTLA W
I admire the vividness and fervency of Litowitz's critique and am
gratified that my decade-old book so stirred him. Regrettably, however,
his essay is decentered from both the geographic and social subjects on
which I had concentrated.
First, Litowitz lacks interest in rural Shasta County.8 He wishes that I
had spent more time talking to employees at the Redding Wal-Mart and
less to owners of land in my study area near Oak Run. He even seems
willing to accept my report that interneighbor relations in barbed-wire
country are relatively harmonious.9 What basically irks him, I infer, is that
I painted a picture in which rural neighbors, with some notable
exceptions, 10 were routinely succeeding in cooperating with one another to
mutual advantage. This riles him because, like most of his compatriots on
the far left, he regards American life as thoroughly infected with classism,
racism, sexism, and related forms of oppression. He implies that I chose to
8. Id. at 317-19, 327-28.
9. Id. at 326.
10. ORDER WITHOUT LAW, supra note 2, at 29-39, 56-64 (discussing Shasta County ranchers who
failed to adequately control their livestock).
20031
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study a rural setting in order to paper over the less sunny aspects of
American social life and hence to defend the status quo."
Litowitz's critique would have been more pertinent if he had had the
patience to fish in the same pond that I had frequented. I of course had
chosen the Oak Run area of Shasta County as my laboratory because it
promised to be especially revealing about Coase's hypothetical account of
interneighbor bargaining in a rural setting. The urban venues in Shasta
County, including its Wal-Mart, surely are also worthy of study, but Order
Without Law was not about them.
I devoted three separate chapters to the issues of cattle trespass, fencing
costs, and highway collisions involving livestock. Litowitz has nothing
whatsoever to say about any of these specific issues and the norms that
govern them. Based on his grounding in Critical theory, he is confident
that norms throughout Shasta County are time-bound, shaped by what he
regards as the County's particularly sordid history, and influenced by
structural forces of racism, sexism, and classism that he thinks pervade all
aspects of American life. 2 But, because he declines to speculate about
how these various forces might shape the particular rural norms I
analyzed, his critique in the end is no more than overly abstract bluster.
What are Litowitz's thoughts on how social structure and power
differences might have shaped the evolution of (for example) Shasta
County fencing norms? On these sorts of grounded questions his Critical
toolbox proved to be of no help.
Second and relatedly, Litowitz is not interested in the subset of the
social world beyond Oak Run that I chose to analyze in Order Without
Law, particularly in its theoretical second half. There I put forth the
hypothesis that members of a close-knit group tend to develop norms that
promote behavior that serves the interests of the group's members in the
aggregate. A group is close-knit, I said, "when power is broadly
11. Litowitz, supra note 3, at 317, 321, 335-36, 342. As it happens, I've devoted much of my
scholarly career to less sunny issues, such as exclusionary land use controls and homelessness. See,
e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J.
385 (1977); The Homelessness Muddle, PUBLIC INTEREST, No. 99, at 45 (Spring 1990).
12. See especially Litowitz, supra note 3, at 323-27, 333-35. In fact, neighbors in urban and
nonwhite settings seem to interact in much the same way that neighbors in Shasta County do. See
ORDER WITHOUT LAW, supra note 2, at 271 n.15 (citing sources that indicate that urban neighbors in
the United States prefer informal dispute resolution). Field investigators studying the resolution of
land-use disputes in the great metropolises of East Asia also report a strong preference for avoiding
resort to courts and other governmental entities with coercive power. See Mark D. West, The
Resolution of Karaoke Disputes: The Calculus of Institutions and Social Capital, 28 J. JAPANESE
STUD. 301, 319-29 (2002) (reporting the results of an empirical study of noise pollution disputes in
urban Japan, where a victim usually starts by informally negotiating with the polluter, and, if that fails,
then files a complaint not in court but with a local-government pollution complaint counselor);
Bradley Klein & Haini Guo, Bargaining in the Shadow of Community: Neighborly Dispute Resolution
in Beijing Hutongs 3-4 (May 9, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (reporting that the
poor residents of Beijing's traditional alley neighborhoods primarily rely on informal norms when
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distributed among group members and the information pertinent to
informal control circulates easily among them."13  Many social
environments indeed are closely knit--typically a law faculty, the repeat
players at a playground, the members of a bridge club. This large
subsector of social life seems to bore Litowitz, perhaps because at bottom
he may share my belief that it is relatively free of conflict. He plainly
would have preferred that I had written about social contexts where the
power of participants is vastly unequal (and thus, by my definition, not
close-knit). 4 Again his archetype is the relationship between the Redding
Wal-Mart and one of its employees (into which he makes no direct
inquiry)."3 One can understand why a social critic as caustic as Litowitz
would aspire to seek out and describe the most anomic sectors of
American life. Order Without Law, however, was not about those sectors.
III. LITOWITZ'S SLAPDASH INVESTIGATORY METHODS
Litowitz is an effective polemicist, but his efforts at empirical,
statistical, and historical research fail to meet scholarly standards.
Whatever its weaknesses, my fieldwork in Shasta County was painstaking
and grounded, ultimately involving seventy-three interviews. In his essay,
Litowitz does not mention a single conversation he had with anyone in
Shasta County. As far as one can tell, during his four-day visit he mostly
drove around and peered through his windshield. He suspects that the Oak
Run area may have experienced significant demographic and economic
changes during the past two decades. If so, he might have stopped to
question the proprietor of the Oak Run general store about the matter.
When Litowitz spied a Wal-Mart in Redding, he imagined it a place of
misery. A true humanist would have seen fit talk to the employees and
consumers there to determine to what extent they share that perspective. 
16
Bent on painting Order Without Law as a sly cover-up of the reality of
human suffering, Litowitz combed the internet for data that might cast
Shasta County in the worst possible light. Regrettably, his use of the
statistics he found is selective and misleading. For example, the California
Institute for County Government (CICG) maintains a website that
provides data on how each California county compares to the state as a
13. ORDER WITHOUT LAW, supra note 2, at 177-78 (emphasis added).
14. Litowitz, supra note 3, at 317-19, 327-28.
15. An employee's main source of leverage against an institutional employer is the threat of
quitting. Litowitz thinks this power is toothless because low-wage workers face a monopsonistic set of
employers. Id. at 321 n.64, 330. In 1998, the 44,000 Shasta County workers employed by private non-
farm businesses were employed by 4,380 different establishments. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
CENSUS BUREAU, COUNTY & CITY DATA BOOK: 2000, at 309 (13th ed., Mar. 2002) [hereinafter cited
as COUNTY DATA BOOK, 2000]. These data, not to mention the help-wanted sections of the Redding
Record Searchlight's classified ads, cast doubt on Litowitz's assessment.
16. Litowitz rightly praises Barbara Ehrenreich for her immersing herself into the world of low-
wage employment. Litowitz, supra note 3, at 321 n.64.
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whole on two dozen social and economic indicators. Of those two dozen,
Litowitz chooses to cite only the three indicators-arrest rates, mental
health treatment rates, air pollution emissions--on which Shasta County
fairs worst in comparison to the rest of the state. 7 On many other CICG
indicators, however, the County significantly outperforms the rest of
California; among them: homeownership, prenatal-care, voter-turnout,
SAT scores, absence of crime.18
He similarly expresses dismay at a variety of Shasta County social
statistics that he cites in isolation instead of in a comparative context. He
notes, for example, that in 2000 the County's population was 89%
Caucasian--"shockingly white" in his eyes.' 9 But how shocking when
Oregon, the state just to the north, was 87% white? Litowitz flags the
incidence of child poverty in Shasta County,20 but on that dimension in
2000 the County was generally in line with both California as a whole and
the other counties in Superior California.2' He asserts that 21% of Shasta
County housing is "substandard" but the sources he seems to cite as
support offer no data on that issue.22 (For what it's worth, the 2000 Census
reported that 99.4% of occupied housing units in Shasta County had
complete plumbing facilities. 23)
Litowitz's uses of history are just as self-serving. His assemblage of a
parade of horrors from Shasta County's past is akin to a television
sportscaster stitching together a videotape of isolated misses of lay-ups to
produce a lowlight film of the performance of a basketball team. Litowitz
would like to portray Shasta County as a place devoid of successes, of acts
of cooperation, of altruism. He correctly identifies the Iron Mountain Mine
(located far from Oak Run, across the Sacramento River) as a major
source of water pollution, but wrongly asserts that it is "dumping" toxics
into the Sacramento River.24 Mining operations at Iron Mountain ceased in
1963. The current problem is that the old mine works are causing a natural
leaching of toxics. Remediation measures instituted over several decades
17. Id. at 321.
18. See Cal. Inst. for County Gov., 2003 County Profiles, available at
http://www.cicg.org/publications/profiles/shasta county.pdf (last visited June 30, 2003) (on file with
author). Note that Litowitz cites the report for 200 1, which was no longer available when I visited this
website.
19. Litowitz, supra note 3, at 322.
20. Id.at321.
21. Shasta County's rate of child poverty in 2000 (28.2%) was somewhat higher than California's
(24.6%), but equal to or below the rate of four of the six counties that Shasta County abuts. See
COUNTY DATA BOOK, 2000, supra note 15, at 212-13 (reporting data for Lassen, Modoc, Plumas,
Siskiyou, Tehama, and Trinity Counties).
22. See sources cited at Litowitz, supra note 3, at 321 nn.66-67.
23. See http://factfinder.census.gov/bf/_lang=en-vt-name=DEC_2000_SF3_U.DP4_geojid
=05000US06089.html (last visited on June 30, 2003).
24. Litowitz, supra note 3, at 324.
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have substantially improved the situation.25 In sum, the latest chapters of
the Iron Mountain Mine saga feature successful collective endeavors
toward environmental improvement.
Litowitz deems the County's history "particularly brutal ' 26  and
backhandedly accuses rural Shastans of a virulent racism--of a desire to
"driv[e] out" those who are different.27 He bases these assertions primarily
on massacres of members of the Wintu tribe that occurred near Redding
during the 1850s and 1860s. 28 (The Oak Run area that I studied actually
was not in Wintu territory, but in that of the Yana, a tribe that also
suffered massacres. 29) While the treatment of Native Americans in Shasta
County during that period indeed was brutal, it was not exceptional. At
that time, Anglos throughout California were engaging in genocidal
practices.3" Litowitz also is too quick to assume that these remote
historical events have had lasting influence. In 1850, long before railroad
tracks were extended north to Redding, Shasta County's population was
364.31 How can Litowitz be confident that pre-Civil-War events in a
sparsely settled frontier setting are still influencing racial attitudes in the
County? To plumb present-day conditions, would it not be more pertinent
to dig up contemporary data on the incidence of anti-discrimination
lawsuits and hate crimes? Or to interview individuals who might currently
be targets of "drive-out" campaigns?
32
Shasta County is no utopia and Redding and Oak Run are hardly fancy
venues. Per capita income in the County measures 81% of that for the
United States as a whole33 and college graduates are much scarcer than
25. . See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Iron Mountain Mine (updated May 9, 2003),
available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/r9/sfund/overview.nsf/0/7a8I66ef298804808825660
b007ee658?OpenDocument#progress (last visited July 7, 2003) (on file with author).
26. Litowitz, supra note 3, at 323.
27. Id. at 326.
28. Id. at 325.
29. Jerald Jay Johnson, Yana, in 8 HANDBOOK OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS: CALIFORNIA 361,
361-63 (Robert Heizer ed., 1978) [hereinafter cited as CALIFORNIA INDIANS].
30. "The overwhelming assault upon the subsistence, life, and culture of all California natives
during the short period from 1848 to 1865 has seldom been duplicated in modem times by an invading
race." Sherburne F. Cook, Historical Demography, in CALIFORNIA INDIANS, supra note 29, at 91, 92;
see also id. at 91 (asserting that the Native American population in California fell from 310,000 in
1770 to 20,000 in 1900); Edward D. Castillo, The Impact of Euro-American Exploration and
Settlement, in CALIFORNIA INDIANS, supra note 29, at 99, 107-13 (offering general review of war
between Anglos and Native Americans in California during 1848-1865, referring to the travails of
members of a total of fifteen different tribes, but not mentioning the Wintu or Yana).
31. Decennial Census of 1850.
32. In 2000 the fraction of the Shasta County population that was Native American was almost
three times larger than the fraction for California as a whole. COUNTY DATA BOOK, 2000, supra note
15, at 69 (reporting that 2.7% of the residents of Shasta County identified themselves as at least partly
either "American Indian or Alaska Native," compared to 1.0% of the residents of California).
Although this statistic hardly proves that the County is especially tolerant of Native Americans, it
torpedoes the notion that County residents have systematically engaged in "drive-out" efforts.
33. COUNTY DATA BOOK, 2000, supra note 15, at 357 (1998 data).
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elsewhere in California.34 But neither is Shasta County a hellhole. Most
residents, like people everywhere, are proud of their community. And
some visitors discover features of enduring appeal. Despite its brutally hot
summers, the County more than doubled in population between 1970 and
2000,3" a rate of increase twice that of California as a whole. Litowitz's
dystopian drive-by imaginings during his four-day visit tell us more about
his dyspepsia than about Shasta County itself.
IV. THE CRACKED LENS OF CRITICAL THEORY
In the 1970s the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement burst upon the
American law school scene with great energy and brashness.36 By the late
1980s, however, CLS had lost upward momentum and since then it has
gone into deep decline. In law journals the rate of citations to CLS work
fell by roughly one-half between 1988-1990 and 2000-2002. 37 By 1996,
Duncan Kennedy, previously CLS's pied-piper-in-chief, was asserting that
the movement was "dead."38
Litowitz identifies himself as a Critical theorist. In the text he quotes the
work of Habermas, Marcuse, Geertz, and the many others who help
inspire the founders of CLS.39 He makes no mention, however, of the
leading CLS scholars themselves (Horwitz, Kelman, Kennedy, Unger).4"
This omission is itself a sign of the decreasing visibility of CLS proper.
Litowitz's essay illustrates some core weaknesses of the Critical paradigm,
ones that have helped send CLS scholarship into eclipse.
A. The Rejection of Positivist Epistemology
Litowitz recoils from my mode of analysis in Order Without
Law-namely, positivist inquiry into the nature and function of informal
norms. Like most Critics, Litowitz embraces some version of the post-
34. Id. at 212-13 (indicating that 14% of Shasta County residents had Bachelor's degrees in 1990,
compared to 23% of Californians as a whole).
35. According to decennial Census data, in 1970 the County's population was 78,000, and in
2000, 163,000.
36. See MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987) (describing the CLS
approach); see also NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 421-501 (1995)
(negatively assessing the movement).
37. 1 arrived at this figure by applying the methods described in Robert C. Ellickson, Trends in
Legal Scholarship: A Statistical Study, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 521-23, 541-43 (2000). Accessing
WestLaw's JLR database data in April 2002, I calculated that the index number for citations to the
phrase critical legal studies in 2000-2002 was 72. The comparable index number for 1988-1990 was
137. Id. at 527.
38. Remarks at the Yale Legal Theory Workshop, Dec. 19, 1996. But compare DUNCAN
KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION 8-10 (1997) (stressing the decline of CLS as a social
movement, not as an academic approach).
39. On the intellectual forebears of CLS thought, see Donald F. Brosnan, Serious but Not Critical,
60 S. CAL. L. REV. 259 (1987).
40. In the footnotes there are single passing references to works by Kelman, Tushnet, and
Horwitz. Litowitz, supra note 3, at 308 n.19, 316 n.48, 341 n.122.
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modernist view that truth is in the eyes of the beholder. He announces that
he is "against positivism" and indicates that he regards normative analysis
as the only defensible form of legal scholarship.4
The excessive pretensions of some social scientists help spawn this
postmodernist overreaction. Like scholars of all stripes, social scientists
are prone to exaggerate both their accomplishments and objectivism.
Those who generate abstract models and regression analyses commonly
attribute too much to their results. And, as Litowitz nicely puts it, "Human
behavior is messy, complex, multidimensional, and resistant to
formulae., 4 2 In practice, even the most committed quantifiers and
modelers fall back at times on intuition and storytelling. An investigator
commonly brings a strong initial bias to a project, but later may either
intentionally or subconsciously attempt to disguise it. Skepticism about
claims made by social scientists thus is healthy, and humanists as a group
are well positioned to offer it.
That said, postmodernism becomes a laughingstock when it lapses into
total nihilism about the possibility of factual knowledge.43 This is the
assessment not only of devotees of law-and-economics, but also of
scholars such as Ronald Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon, whose
world-views are far different.44 When the New York Times terminated
journalist Jayson Blair in the spring of 2003 for fabricating stories about
human events, would Litowitz have defended Blair's concoctions on the
ground that they were "just another perspective" on reality? I would think
not. Early on Litowitz articulates the most nihilistic version of postmodern
theory, but as the essay progresses he retreats. By the end he comes close
to arriving at the utterly uncontroversial position that while certain
physical facts (such as the height of Mount Shasta) can be verified, it is
normative judgments that are always contestable.45
Positivists themselves, of course, standardly distinguish between facts
and values. To them, assertions about social facts, such as the wage rates
of those employed at the Redding Wal-Mart and the extent of starvation in
Shasta County, are potentially subject to falsification. On the other hand, a
claim like Litowitz's that Wal-Mart wages are "inadequate ' 46 is a value
judgment that is arguable but not refutable.
41. Id. at 329-37 (Section ll.C ("Against Positivism")).
42. Id. at 333.
43. This is not the place, and I am not the author, for a lengthy inquiry into the philosophy of
science. For discussion of these issues, including the limitations of Karl Popper's version of logical
positivism, see Thomas E. Ulen, A Nobel Prize in Legal Science: Theory, Empirical Work, and the
Scientific Method in the Study of Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 875.
44. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Points Against Postmodernism, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 687 (2000);
Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It, 24 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 87 (1996)
(asserting the existence of right legal answers). On the general topic, see Dennis Patterson,
Normativity and Objectivity in Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 325 (2001).
45. Litowitz, supra note 3, at 329-31, 339.
46. Id. at 330. Cf id. 308 n. 19 (asserting a "historical reality of starvation wages").
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Litowitz believes that the existence of a particular norm in Shasta
County is not an issue like the height of Mount Shasta, but rather a social
text that cannot be verified or falsified.47 In such situations, he asserts that
commentators can do no better than to offer alternative interpretations,
none of which can be dismissed as false. I disagree. A proposition about
the presence of a norm is a factual assertion, one potentially capable of
verification and refutation.48 When one observes law students engaging in
negative gossip about "gunners" (students who talk too much in class),
one has evidence of the existence of norm against gunning. Litowitz
somehow regards descriptive propositions about norms as statements that
are themselves normative in content. For example, he oddly asserts that
my view, that the norms of a close-knit group can work to the
disadvantage of outsiders, "cuts the heart out"49 of my analysis. How so, if
my goal was to describe norms, not to praise them?
In fact, when Litowitz's motor starts to run, he dumps both factual and
moral relativism in a heartbeat. While he once refers to Redding as
"Anytown, USA,"5 he mainly attempts to portray Shasta County as one of
California's chief cesspools.51 In this effort Litowitz abandons his
epistemic skepticism. He asserts one historical and demographic fact after
another and shows no reluctance to draw conclusions about their proper
normative interpretation. Indeed, he eventually comes to the decidedly
positivistic conclusion that I "provide a false picture of a harmonious
community. 52 This is hardly a postmodem assessment of another's
interpretation of a "social text."
B. The Stereotyping of Social-Scientific Theories of Human Behavior
The Critical leftists in the legal academy rarely engage in mutually
advantageous exchanges with those involved in mainstream social-
scientific study of legal issues.53 Those who ignore this huge body of
academic work typically feel compelled to put forward some
rationalization for their aversion to it. Like many CLS scholars before
him, Litowitz resorts to the stereotype that economists, public-choice
theorists, and the like are overly wedded to a rational-actor model of
human behavior that is disqualifyingly simplistic.54 In my view, this
47. Id. at pp. 305, 318, 340-41.
48. See ORDER WITHOUT LAW, supra note 2, at 130.
49. Litowitz, supra note 3, at 335.
50. Id. at 322.
51. Id. at 317, 321-26.
52. Id. at 322 (emphasis added).
53. A notable exception is Mark Kelman. See, e.g., Mark Kelman, Yuval Rottenstreich & Amos
Tversky, Context-Dependence in Legal Decision Making, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 287 (1996). Cf Litowitz,
supra note 3, at 341 (urging Critical theorists to "jump into the debate over social norms").
54. Litowitz assumes that a devotee of methodological individualism must embrace a rational-
actor model. See, e.g., Litowitz, supra note 3, at 312. This isn't so. A methodological individualist
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position had some credibility in the 1970s when Chicagoans were
excessively privileging the parsimony of theory over predictive power."
Many of the gods in Litowitz's pantheon-Foucault, Geertz, Habermas,
and so on-made their names by challenging social-scientific orthodoxies
that prevailed in the 1960s and 1970s.
But the academic world has moved on.5 6 The unalloyed rational-actor
models once applied by Chicagoan analysts are now widely regarded as
inconsistent with an overwhelming body of evidence that people
commonly cooperate in social contexts where selfish and rational actors
would not. Currently some of hottest topics in the academy are the
interrelated issues of trust, social capital, socialization, and norms.57
Investigators trained in a wide variety of disciplines are tackling these
issues, using the tools of game theory, experimental economics, cognitive
psychology, evolutionary biology, even the brain sciences. The most
ambitious work is self-consciously interdisciplinary. An example is
Herbert Gintis's effort to combine core concepts from sociology, biology,
and economics to explain human cooperation.58
Litowitz's essay includes numerous citations to portions of this
emerging literature. Nonetheless the import of this intellectual tide eludes
him. In the crunch he reverts to this dated Critical stereotype of the hard-
edged social sciences: "the methodological individualism favored by
Ellickson and the New Chicago School brackets all questions of structure
and instead views people as isolated monads who freely choose all their
actions."59 "Isolated monads?"6 "Freely choose?" The central point of
Order Without Law and others' kindred work is that individuals are
constrained by a multitude of intertwined external forces-among them:
insists only that a social action, such as a cross-burning, is committed by individuals, not by "social
forces." Methodological individualists may hold a variety of different views about to what extent
people are, for example, rational decisionmakers or susceptible to social pressure from other
individuals. For discussion, see Mark Kelman, Law and Behavioral Science: Conceptual Overviews,
97 Nw. U.L. REV. 1345, 1388-92 (2003). On the debate among social scientists over the merits of
methodological individualism, see Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Economics and Sociology: The
Prospects for an Interdisciplinary Discourse on Law, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 389.
55. See Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors, 65 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 23 (1989) (cited at Litowitz, supra note 3, at 335 n.107).
56. See, e.g., Symposium, Empirical Legal Realism: A New Social Scientific Assessment of Law
and Human Behavior, 97 Nw. U.L. REV. 1075 (2003).
57. Litowitz's essay usefully assembles much of the legal scholarship that draws on the
multidisciplinary work on these topics. See, e.g., sources cited at Litowitz, supra note 3, at 301-03
nn.1-8 (social norms) and at 322 n.69 (behavioral law and economics). The trendsetting MacArthur
and Russell Sage Foundations have begun to support social-scientific research on these topics. See
http://www-unix.oit.umass.edu/-gintis/ (last visited on July 7, 2003) (on the MacArthur supported
Network on Norms and Preferences); Russell Sage Foundation, "Examining the Role of Trust in
Society," http://www.nissellsage.org/about/trust-news.pdf (last visited on July 7, 2003).
58. Herbert Gintis, Solving the Puzzle of Prosociality, 15 RATIONALITY & SOC'Y 155 (2003). See
also Vernon L. Smith, Constructivist and Ecological Rationality in Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV.
465 (2003) (discussing the same puzzle).
59. Litowitz, supra note 3, at 332.
60. The metaphor has venerable roots. Karl Marx seems to have coined it in On the Jewish
Question (1843), reprinted in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 26, 42 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978).
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law, inherited emotional dispositions, cognitive biases, norms internalized
through socialization, and uninternalized norms enforced by peers.61 The
Critical trope that social-scientists standardly conceive of humans as
"isolated monads" is not only tired but, as the years pass, increasing
ludicrous.
C. Unrelenting, Yet Unconstructive, Criticism
CLS foundered in part because most of its practitioners shied away from
developing a credible program of affirmative social engineering.62 A critic
as insistent as Litowitz must anticipate being asked what he would do to
rescue the people of Shasta County from the squalor, poverty, and
oppression that he thinks engulfs them. If Litowitz truly regards the Oak
Run area as a Dogpatch consisting of "some dilapidated shacks with
burned out cars"63 (a reckless assertion in itself),' what housing and anti-
poverty policies would he advocate? If he desires to diminish the role of
corporations in the American economy, with what would he replace them?
Litowitz criticizes Dan Kahan's ideas on crime in the inner city for lacking
"deep structural analysis," but offers no hint about the specific policies
that such an analysis would yield.65
V. TOWARD A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE HUMANITIES AND THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES
Scholars in both the humanities and social sciences can benefit from
cross-fertilization. In my own scholarly work I have been deeply
dependent on humanistic sources. At various points earlier in this essay,
for example, to add vividness I invoked the powerful imagery of Walt
Whitman, Karl Marx, and the cartoonist Al Capp. In my work on whalers'
norms, Herman Melville's Moby-Dick proved to be invaluable.66 On issues
of homelessness and poverty in the United States, the fieldwork of
journalists such as Celia Dugger and William Finnegan was more
illuminating than most efforts by academicians.67 In my various historical
61. See, e.g., ORDER WITHOUT LAW, supra note 2, at 131 (presenting a table that lays out
elements of a comprehensive system of social control).
62. But see, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, American Law Through English Eyes, 84 GEO. L.J. 2215,
2240-41 (1996) (reviewing DUXBURY, supra note 36) (offering rebuttal to this charge); William H.
Simon, Social-Republican Property, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1335 (1991) (endorsing limited-equity
housing cooperatives, among other policies).
63. Litowitz, supra note 3, at 326.
64. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (on incidence of substandard housing in Shasta
County).
65. Litowitz, supra note 3, at 316 n.49.
66. See Robert C. Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the
Whaling Industry, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83 (1989).
67. See citations at Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of
Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1205 n.206, 1218 n.296
(1996) [hereinafter cited as City Spaces].
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essays I have borrowed copiously from works by historians; some notables
among them: J.M. Postgate (ancient Mesopotamian land regimes),68 Esther
Kingston-Mann (Russian peasant villages),69 Eric H. Monkkonen (policing
of American skid-rows),7 ° Seymour Toll (zoning in New York City).7 I
have drawn much from the work of anthropologist Sally Engle Merry on
gossip, anthropologist Melville Herskovits on preliterates' property
systems,73 sociologist Peter Rossi on homelessness, 74 and sociologist
Donald L. Black on systems of social control.75 There is no need to go on.
Absent humanistic input, most of my scholarly work would have been
impoverished. And most law-and-economics scholars could tell a similar
tale.
Humanists, conversely, have much to gain from social scientists. A legal
scholar oriented toward the humanities who refuses to keep an eye on
developments in the social sciences risks the shame of insularity. Beyond
that, humanists can borrow social-scientific constructs to sharpen their
own stories and analyses. Best of all, they can offer pertinent and careful
criticisms of what they read when they venture beyond their home turf.
The humanistic impulse to particularize and complexify is an essential
counterweight to the reductionist tendencies of scholars who are more
mathematically inclined.
Opportunistically appealing to this Journal's core readers, I assert that
Coase and I have a humanistic outlook on social life. We anticipate that
individuals and households, even when largely left to their own devices,
commonly will do a passable job of collectively meeting the challenges of
daily life. By contrast, many Critics, despite their professedly egalitarian
ideology, seem to regard the capabilities of ordinary people with
contempt. Litowitz thinks that all Shasta County residents are defenseless
when dealing with corporate employers, prone to domineer one another,
and mired in an ugliness of their own creation. One detects a particular
condescension toward people who live in manufactured housing, a
68. See the copious citations to J.N. POSTGATE, EARLY MESOPOTAMIA: SOCIETY AND ECONOMY
AT THE DAWN OF HISTORY (1992) in Robert C. Ellickson & Charles Dia. Thorland, Ancient Land
Law: Mesopotamia, Egypt, Israel, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321 (1995).
69. See the multiple citations to various of Kingston-Mann's works in footnotes at Robert C.
Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1393-94 (1993) [hereinafter cited as Property in
Land].
70. See citations to ERIC H. MONKKONEN, POLICE IN URBAN AMERICA 1860-1920 (1981) in the
footnotes of City Spaces, supra note 67, at 1200-02 (1996).
71. See citations to SEYMOUR 1. TOLL, ZONED AMERICAN (1969) at Robert C. Ellickson,
Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L.
REV. 681, 691 n.32, 701 n.70 (1973).
72. See the multiple citations to various of Merry's works in ORDER WITHOUT LAW, supra note 2.
73. See the multiple citations to MELVILLE J. HERSKOVITS, ECONOMIC ANTHROPOLOGY (1952) in
Property in Land, supra note 69.
74. See the copious citations to PETER H. ROSSI, DOWN AND OUT IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS OF
HOMELESSNESS (1989) in City Spaces, supra note 67.
75. See the multiple citations to various of Black's works in ORDER WITHOUT LAW, supra note 2.
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dissonant note from a commentator professedly concerned about
classism.7 6 From the very beginning of his project Litowitz regarded the
residents of Redding and Oak Run not as individuals but as--how else to
say it?-isolated monads.
76. See, e.g., Litowitz, supra note 3, at 326 (". . . depressing trailer [sic] park.").
[Vol. 15:333
14
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol15/iss2/3
